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*John Roper
In addressing the working relationships among the three institutions responsible for
European and transatlantic relations in the field of security, it is necessary to examine why
they were relatively separate until the beginning of this present decade, why they had
initially so much difficulty in developing affective patterns of cooperation, why this is now
improving, and what the prospects are for their future cooperation into the 21st century.
It must be noted from the onset that some of the problems of developing effective working
relationships arise from the different, albeit overlapping memberships of the European
Union and NATO; and while all the full members of WEU are members of both NATO
and EU, the existence of a third player cannot be said to have always been helpful.
THE COLD WAR: AN EFFECTIVE DIVISION OF LABOUR
Until 1990 there was a broad functional division between NATO and the European
Community (as it then was), NATO had been created in 1949 as a collective defence
organisation with primarily political and military functions for its member states. When
the European Economic Community was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 it
had an implicit security purpose referred to in the phrase in the preamble where the
signatories talk of their resolve “to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by
establishing this combination of resources”. One of the driving factors behind the Treaty
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(as it had been behind the earlier Treaty of 1951 establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community - ECSC) was the determination to provide an economic framework
for the reconciliation of France and Germany and to put an end to the running conflicts
between those powers which had in the lifetime of those negotiating the treaties twice
brought such devastation to Europe. The whole of the European Communities’ work
until 1970 (and very largely until the end of the Cold War) was therefore in the economic
area, although it did have an essential security function in helping to create, together
with NATO, a network of cooperation and integration among its members so as to
establish a “security community” among its members in the terms defined by Karl Deutsch:
“one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight
each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way”1.
In foreign and security policy there was a broad distinction made: NATO took
the responsibility for the external security of Western Europe, while the European
Community set out to develop an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity under
the security umbrella of NATO and, particularly, the nuclear guarantee of the United
States. It is true that NATO in the case of the recurring disputes between Greece and
Turkey and the episodic “cod wars” between the United Kingdom and Iceland did
attempt (more or less formally) to use its good offices to resolve conflicts between
NATO members, but in both cases these involved non-members of the European
Community. After 1970, the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC)
among the member states of the European Community meant that the foreign policy
was to some extent coordinated, but this very clearly excluded security policy and the
member states had a “self-denying ordinance on anything with a military flavour”2.
The five countries who had signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948 to create the
forerunner of WEU did so to provide evidence of European readiness to make
arrangements for their own collective defence; however, with the creation of NATO
and the development of its integrated command structure, the organisation became
more formal than substantial. And, indeed, when the Brussels Treaty was modified in
1954 to create the Western European Union and provide a basis for German
membership of WEU and NATO, a new Article IV was inserted making this clear.
“In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs
established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the
Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for
information on military matters.”
As a result of this WEU had, before 1993, no military staff of its own, apart from
some officers in the ARMS Control Agency who were exclusively concerned with
obligations among WEU’s members.
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By 1954, the original Brussels Treaty, which had in 1948 set itself broad goals for
economic, social and cultural collaboration as well as collective self-defence, came to
be modified, also. Understand by then that both OEEC (later OECD) and ECSC had
been created; thus Article 1 of the Treaty, which set out the economic objectives, was
amended to avoid any competition with them by the addition of the following clause:
“The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, shall not involve any
duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations, in which
the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented, but shall on the contrary assist
the work of those organisations.”
WEU’s activities were very largely formal for most of the next three decades, but
it can be seen that it was treaty bound not to trespass on the clearly defined areas of
NATO and the European Communities. Thus, until the end of the nineteen eighties
there was very little requirement to develop working relationships; in place of these, a
benign but unplanned synergy existed between NATO and the European Communities
which ensured the peace and prosperity of the West.
PROBLEMS OF SUCCESS: FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP
AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR
This neat division did not survive the end of the Cold War; all three institutions
had to adjust to a very different security environment. Although there was a large overlap
among their membership (total in the case of the WEU), the adjustments were made
in ways which reduced the combined effectiveness of the organisations and have led to
situations in which they have often appeared competitive rather than complementary
and mutually supporting. The description of them (together with the OSCE) as being
“interlocking” has too often led to the uncharitable comment that they’ve been more
frequently “interblocking” than “interlocking”.
Unlike the two World Wars of this century, where a good deal of time was spent
during the war in foreign ministries in planning for the post-war arrangements, there
was little preparation for the post-Cold War. There was a need for readjustment both
in understanding what the objectives and priorities of foreign and security policies
were, and also, in agreeing on via what institutional frameworks they would  be
conducted. On this there were not only differences among Western European countries
and across the Atlantic, but also on certain occasions within countries and even within
governments. The organisations themselves had their own implicit if not explicit agendas.
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It is not necessarily the case that Secretariats or Commissions have always been neutral
- they have had their own interests if only of self-preservation. In these circumstances
it is not surprising that the development of effective working relationships has been
difficult, and may not be fully completed until the new millennium.
There have been different reasons for this apart from the political differences in
approach of key member states. While NATO and the EU Commission and Council
had all three been based in Brussels for over twenty years, there were very considerable
differences in culture, both in their secretariats and in the missions from member states.
NATO was explicitly a political-military organisation and the EC a civil organisation,
and it was always surprising how little contact there was between them. Their
geographical collocation had very little effect on even informal contact. WEU was until
January 1993 based in London; and, even when it arrived, its very small size 3 , compared
with NATO or the EU, meant that its presence could do little to bridge the gap between
two very disparate cultures. Even though it was also a political-military organisation
with the obligation in its 1954 Treaty to rely on NATO for military advice, it took
until May 1996 before a Security Agreement was reached between NATO and WEU
permitting the exchange of classified information and documents between the two
organisations. The fact that there were two, and in some cases three, diplomatic missions
from the member states in Brussels reporting to different parts of their foreign and
defence ministries meant that even the commonality of membership hardly guaranteed
any effective coordination.
1991 was to see parallel developments in NATO and the European Community,
as it then was called, which were to lead to the institutional incoherence of the early
nineties. Perhaps as significant to see, also, was the beginning of the dissolution of
the former Yugoslavia: Indeed, it was the inadequacies of the response to this problem
by the key members of the various institutions that was one of the factors which
led the drive for a more rational structure after 1995. In November 1991, NATO
agreed on its New Strategic Concept setting out the risks - no longer threats- that
its members faced in the post-Cold War. In setting out the principles of Alliance
strategy it asserted “The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons
will ever be used except in self-defence....” Although there was some discussion of
crisis management and conflict prevention, treating this issue was still very much
in its preliminary stage.
At the same time, the members of the European Union and WEU were busy
preparing the texts of the Treaty on European Union and the Declaration by the
members of WEU to be agreed at Maastricht a month later in December 1991. These
(very much as a result of Franco-German initiatives) were to establish a structure to
develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy for European Union (CFSP) and a
much more prominent position for Western European Union, which its then Secretary
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General William van Eekelen saw as acting as a bridge between NATO and European
Union. In the context of this paper there was no discussion of the working relationship
between NATO and the European Union; however, the Treaty on European Union
states in Article J,4.2, “ The Union requests Western European Union, which is an
integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions
and actions of the Union which have defence implications”. In addition, the Declaration
of the Member States of Western European Union on the role of WEU and its relation
with the European Union and the Western European Union with the Atlantic Alliance4
does make explicit statements on the development of the working relations between
WEU and the other two bodies.
Before looking at these it is worth noting what all members of WEU agreed at
Maastricht.
“WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security
and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This
identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU
will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union
and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance, WEU
Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of
a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a
common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.
WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and
as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it
will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete
implementation through the further development of its own operational role”.
Turning to the development of closer relationships with European Union, the
WEU declaration made five specific proposals:
- as appropriate, synchronisation of the dates and venues of meetings and
harmonisation of working methods;
- establishment of close cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General
of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and the General Secretariat
of the Council on the other;
- consideration of the harmonisation of the sequence and duration of the respective
Presidencies;
- arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the
European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU
activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the common foreign and
security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union;
- encouragement of closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of
WEU and the European Parliament.
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It is difficult from material in the public domain to analyse how far these five
proposals were implemented, but some comments can be made. While some working
groups involving experts from capitals of the WEU and EU have met on consecutive
dates (to economise on travel costs), the fact that there was no overlap between the
representations in Brussels to the WEU and the EU (unlike the partial overlap in
NATO) meant that there was no need for synchronisation of the weekly cycles of
Brussels-based meetings. The venues of the regular ministerial meetings were not
synchronised, although during the Yugoslav crisis WEU foreign ministers did come
to meet on occasions in the margins of the Foreign Affairs Councils of the EU, as
happened in the Hague September 19, 1991. In reverse, the EU Foreign Ministers
met in Luxembourg in the margins of the WEU Ministerial Council on November
22, 1993.
The second commitment to ensure close cooperation between the two Councils
and Secretariats was implemented primarily through the country which had the
presidency of the European Union, which included in its representation to the WEU
Council representatives of the EU Council Secretariat and, sometimes, members of the
Commission for selected items of WEU business. There was some exchange of
documents. Liaison in the other direction was handicapped by the very small size of
the WEU Secretariat.
The proposal on the harmonisation of the Presidencies of the two organisations
was advocated by those who wished to see the rapid integration of the WEU and EU,
and opposed by those who did not. In fact, the duration of the WEU Presidency was
reduced to six months from July 1, 1994, which may well have had some negative
effects on the organisation; still, the only time in which the Presidencies have coincided
was in the first half of 1996 when Spain had the Presidency of both bodies, and there
is little evidence that this overlap significantly improved working relations.
The proposal for cooperation between the European Parliament and the Assembly
of WEU seems to have remained intact. The WEU Assembly has to date been
enthusiastic about plans to bring the two bodies closer together and opposed to merger.
The 1991 Declaration of WEU Member States also made proposals “to develop
further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance”:
- WEU Member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which
represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions
agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the
essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on
policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the North
Atlantic Treaty.
- Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronised and working
methods harmonised.
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- Close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats General of WEU
and NATO.
The results here were mixed. As far as the development of “joint positions” is
concerned, progress was very slow and the number of occasions on which such joint
positions introduced very limited.  Nevertheless, the fact that there was some overlap
between the representation of Member States to WEU and NATO meant that there
was an opportunity for more informal exchanges. The Ambassador of the country holding
the Presidency of the WEU reported on work in WEU to the weekly meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, although this practice did not occur in the reverse direction
after attendance at the WEU Council included countries not members of NATO.
In view of the overlap in National Delegations, WEU’s weekly schedule of meetings
in Brussels had to take into account the NATO schedule. There were joint meetings
of the permanent Councils of the two organisations every six months or so but, initially,
these tended to be more formal than substantial. WEU Ministerial meetings tended
to take place in advance of NATO Ministerials, yet these were not harmonised formally.
On the only occasion when a WEU Ministerial and a NATO Ministerial occurred on
the same day in the same place, namely in the margins of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki
on July 10th 1992, it is easier to interpret the motivation as being one of competition
rather than of cooperation.
There were formal meetings at middle levels between the secretariats of the two
bodies, but the restrictions on the exchange of classified information until 1996 limited
their effectiveness. The Secretaries General exchanged visits to the two Ministerial
Councils, though it is probably reasonable to evaluate these as having been primarily
symbolic rather than substantial.
Part of the explanation for the limited development of cooperation can be attributed
to the internal dynamic of the three organisations as each tried to define its role and
substantial policies for European security in the unfamiliar surroundings of the post-
Cold War world. Part must, however, be attributed to the strong views of some of the
key countries about their own preferences for the institutional development. France,
Germany and Spain wished to see the fullest development of a defence role for the
European Union - even at the cost of NATO, as was suggested in the case of France.
Britain and, initially, Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands were very defensive of
NATO’s position and reluctant to see it eroded, believing that this would run the risk
of reducing North American commitments to European security. Britain, in addition,
was very sceptical about any growing role for the European Union and appeared to
resile rapidly from the commitments she had taken at Maastricht about the WEU being
built in stages as the defence component of the European Union. Such discordant views
certainly handicapped developments as can be seen by the inadequate responses to the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
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1991-1995 EUROPE’S YUGOSLAV DISASTERS
This is not the occasion for a complete analysis nor a complete judgement of the
combination of errors by European and North American countries which occurred
between 1991 and 1995 in and around the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. There
were many remarkable, positive efforts by individual Europeans and their armed forces
which should not be minimised;but, as regards dealing with the first post-Cold War
crisis, the efforts did not very often demonstrate the effective working relations between
the various bodies, and indeed all too often saw a reversion to patterns of diplomatic
activity more reminiscent of a nineteenth century “concert of powers” than of the
constructive development of a European Security and Defence Identity.
The following are perhaps the most depressing examples of the failure to use the
three institutions as mutually reinforcing bodies: Reference has already been made to
the extraordinary situation in Helsinki on July 10, 1992 when, after a special WEU
Ministerial Council had been held in the margins of the CSCE summit to agree on the
dispatch of a naval force under WEU auspices to the Adriatic to monitor UN embargoes
and sanctions against former Yugoslavia, the same nine ministers from WEU countries
- now accompanied by their American, Canadian, Danish, Greek, Icelandic, Norwegian
and Turkish colleagues - met an hour later as a special NATO Ministerial Council and
agreed on the despatch of a second force under NATO auspices. In fact, thanks to
skillful Italian command, these two forces operated together and were eventually
combined as operation “Sharp Guard”. However, allied cooperation was seriously
challenged in November 1994 when the United States announced the withdrawal of
its direct support for the enforcement of the UN arms embargo, a decision which had
potentially serious effects on the WEU/NATO forces on the eve of a WEU Ministerial
meeting at Noordwijk.
The meeting of a group of members of the UN Security Council in Washington
on May 20, 1993, where a Joint Action Plan was decided on that effectively abandoned
the Vance-Owen Plan, was a clear occasion when a group of countries acted without
consultation in either the North Atlantic Council or the European Union Council.
The Danish Presidency of the European Union, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands
all made it clear that they were opposed not only to the content of the decision, but
also to the process by which it had been arrived at.
A year later the establishment of the “Contact Group”, whose creation did not
derive from either the European Union or NATO, effectively by-passed the existing
institutional channels. The European members were not the troika of the European
Union Presidency; instead, the three major European powers were. Without disputing
the Contact Group’s effectiveness, its creation must be seen as again by-passing the
institutional structures and, to that extent, as an example of reducing their relevance.
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Finally, when President Chirac convened in Paris on June 3, 1995 a meeting of
troop-contributing countries who were also members of the European Union and
NATO, this was done as an ad hoc meeting of nations without any institutional
framework. The decision to deploy a more heavily armed Rapid Reaction Force with
armour and artillery from Britain, France and the Netherlands was taken outside any
institutional framework - such a force was totally unrelated to either WEU or NATO.
This set of examples (apart from the first one) has been given to show that while
there may not have been particularly close working relations between the institutions,
this was in part because the key states at critical moments chose to bypass institutional
structures. Although there were some examples of effective intra-institutional cooperation
- as in the EU’s civil administration in Mostar where WEU provided some police
assistance, or in the post-Dayton cooperation between NATO and the European Union
in Bosnia - the overall picture was not encouraging.
1995-1997 - SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT
The January 1994 NATO Summit launched the concept of Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTFs), which was a mechanism to permit forces and headquarters made
available to NATO to be deployed in some circumstances under European control.
This was intended to provide a mechanism for effective cooperation with WEU. For
the first eighteen months to two years after the announcement little progress was made
on developing the modalities of such cooperation - tensions between the United States
and Europe over policy in former Yugoslavia and traditional French suspicions of
NATO mechanisms being partially responsible for this. In some ways the experience
of IFOR, which itself had many of the characteristics of a CTJF, was to help to transform
the situation. The new attitude of France and Spain also helped to change the
atmosphere. Both countries had been outside NATO’s integrated command structure,
but on December 5, 1995 France announced that it would follow the Spanish model
and participate fully in the work of NATO’s Military Committee and International
Military Staff. This change in climate was demonstrated in the communiqué of the
NATO Ministerial meeting held in Berlin on June 3, 1996, in which for the first time
considerable progress on the way a CTJF would work in practice was shown, including
the “creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the
political control and strategic direction of the WEU.”
Since then, there has been a good deal of practical planning: on one hand, WEU
identifying illustrative missions which it might wish to undertake; and on the other,
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NATO military staff developing initial plans for such missions. WEU has also, since
its Ostend Ministerial meeting of November 1996, begun to play an active part in
NATO’s defence planning process, having made a contribution to the 1997 NATO
Ministerial Guidance that will set the future parameters for such planning. The
discussions on a framework agreement between NATO and WEU to govern the transfer,
monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities referred to in WEU’s Paris
Declaration of May 13, 1997 shows that practical details are now being taken forward.
There is now planning underway for the first exercise whereby the CTJF formula would
be used with the WEU Council in political control. It can therefore be claimed that,
due to the change in French attitudes towards NATO, working relationships between
WEU and NATO have significantly improved over the last eighteen months. There
are, however, still other issues outstanding in the development of the new NATO; and,
it is of course possible that if these are not resolved before the NATO Madrid Summit
on July 8-9,1997, the progress in WEU/NATO relations may be set back.
There has been less progress in the working relationship between the EU and
WEU. This has been partly due to the slow progress in the development of the CFSP
and the difficulty in defining two things: first, what sort of foreign policy actor the
European Union should be; and second, how far the foreign and security policy was
to be either a replacement for the policies of the individual members or rather an
addition to what they would continue to do by themselves. The lack of progress has
also resulted from the continuing division between Britain and the other full members
of WEU on the implementation of their Maastricht commitment “to build up WEU
in stages as the defence component of the European Union”. It is by no means clear
whether the recent change of government in Britain has affected this. Initial signs are
not particularly encouraging. Most members would like to see some progress at the
IGC, which is expected to complete its work at Amsterdam on June 16/17, 1997. There
is still a possibility that language will be found to ensure that a reference to the
“Petersburg” tasks of WEU - humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking - may be
incorporated in some way into the EU’s missions. Interestingly enough, language along
these lines was put forward in the Finnish-Swedish memorandum of April 25, 1996
and, therefore, should not present problems to the five EU members who are not
members of WEU.
Until the language issue is resolved it will be difficult to take cooperation between
the EU and WEU forward. Still, the WEU Paris Ministerial Council May 1997
Declaration does make reference to “meetings of a WEU/European Union ad hoc group
and the holding of a seminar which had brought together representatives of States
belonging to both Organisations....” as examples of the intensification of work between
the two bodies. It also stated work has been done on the “modus operandi” for the
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implementation of paragraph 2 of Article J, 4 of the Treaty on European Union signed
at Maastricht. The response that WEU had made to the request made by the European
Union on the Great Lakes region in application of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty is referred
to, though the fact that WEU was unable to take positive action in this case, nor in
Albania, is seen by some as disappointing. It is probably inevitable that the uncertainty
surrounding the outcome of the IGC will have had its impact on the development of
closer working methods in advance of Amsterdam in June; after Amsterdam, though,
and perhaps irrespective of the outcome of the IGC, the removal of uncertainty may
make it possible for more progress to be made.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
At least as far as NATO/WEU relations are concerned there are now, subject
to other issues being resolved before the Madrid Summit, positive signs of developing
relations. A satisfactory Europeanisation of the command structure of NATO would
clearly facilitate this in the future, as would practical experience of the use of CTJF
by the WEU. The other helpful development would be the possible accession of
Sweden, Finland and Austria to NATO, and then to the WEU. In all three countries
this possibility is now being discussed much more openly than in the past; in addition,
political changes in Sweden could significantly increase the likelihood that it occurs
within the next five years. Such developments would clearly reduce the asymmetries
among the memberships of the three bodies and facilitate closer working ties. The
future of the CSFP depends on much more than institutional changes in the IGC,
though. A consensus about the substance of the CFSP is probably a prerequisite for
the next steps forward in clarifying the relationship between the European Union
and WEU. The fact that the new British government will be involved from the start
in this debate of substance may ease the way for subsequent consequential institutional
changes.
While the working relationships among the three bodies have been far from
adequate to the challenges facing them during the first half of the nineties, the future
prospects would seem to be more encouraging. In the longer term we may even be able
to move to a situation where the principle of the 14th Century English Franciscan,
William of Occam, known as Occam’s Razor, entia non sunt miltiplicanda praeter
necessitatem5 could be applied, thus leading to only two institutions. The debate on
the working relationship between them would at least ensure plenty of work for academic
security analysts as well as for those in government well into the twenty-first century.
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Notes
1. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 1957. Westport, Conn., p.8.
2. Simon J. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation. 1992. Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.13.
3. The budget of WEU is only one fortieth of that of NATO. It was only after 1992 that it began to
develop any operational capacity.
4. The use of the phrase “Atlantic Alliance” was a courtesy to France who still had certain sensitivities
to references to NATO.
5. trans: Entities should not be unnecessarily multiplied.
88
John Roper
Afers Internacionals, 38-39
